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LISA ANN JONES. J 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE . 
CASE NO. 990997 
: PRIORITY NO. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) provides jurisdiction over an 
appeal transferred to this Court by the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW, 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment on 
the basis that Bronson could not make a prima facie of alienation 
of affections? 
The granting of summary judgment presents questions of law, 
to be reviewed without deference for correctness. See e.g. 
Schurtz v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111-12 (Utah 
1991). 
This issue was addressed in Ms. Bronson's memorandum opposing 
summary judgment (R. 61-83). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not granting 
Bronson's leave to amend her complaint to plead invasion of 
privacy? 
Refusal to grant leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of 
discretion. See e.g. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktq., 
Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah 1988). 
This issue was addressed in Ms. Bronson's memorandum in 
support of motion to amend. (R. 94-99). 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules pertain: 
Rule 15. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues 
not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause 
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues 
may be made upon motion of any party at any timef even 
after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is 
objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may 
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of 
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable 
the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Tammy Bronson filed suit against Lisa Ann Jones alleging 
inter alia, alienation of affections, negligent interference with 
marital relationship and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress resulting from an extra marital sexual relationship 
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between Bronson's husband and Jones, Tammy Bronson vs. Lisa Ann 
Jones, Civil No. 990900347. (R. 1-7). 
Jones moved to dismiss the second, fourth and fifth causes of 
action of the Complaint. (R. 8-13). Bronson did not oppose the 
motion and the trial court granted the motion (R. 24-25). 
Jones thereafter moved for summary judgment on the remaining 
counts of alienation of affections and emotional distress. (R.26-
37). Bronson opposed the motion (R. 61-83), and Jones filed a 
reply memorandum. (R. 115-119). 
Bronson also moved to amend her complaint to conform to the 
evidence. She alleged invasion of privacy and its collateral 
infliction emotional distress. (R. 86-99). Jones opposed the 
amendment. (R. 120-124). Bronson replied to the opposition. (R. 
131-140). 
Judge Hanson heard the motion for summary judgment and the 
motion to amend on August 2, 1999. The trial court granted summary 
judgment and denied the motion to amend in a Memorandum Decision 
dated August 31, 2000. (R. 144-148)(Addendum IV), and in an order 
dated and filed on October 19, 1999. (R. 162-165). 
Bronson filed a timely notice of appeal on November 11, 1999 
(R. 166-168). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff/Appellant [Bronson] is the wife of Lawrence Tracy 
Bronson. They were married on or about March 24, 1988. They have 
two children. (R. 74-77). Shortly after Bronson's marriage, her 
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husband got involved in a sexual affair with Defendant/Appellee 
[Jones]. R.74-77). Jones became pregnant. Since the birth of 
Jones's child, Jones has repeatedly called Bronson's home, asking 
Bronson's husband to continue the old affair or to ask the husband 
to leave Bronson. The purpose of the calls to Bronson's home had 
nothing to do with the welfare of Jones's child, but were 
specifically calculated to harm Bronson's marriage. (R. 74-77). 
Bronson's husband discontinued visitations with Jones's child to 
protect his marriage and to discourage Jones from calling his 
home. But, Jones continued her incessant telephone calls to 
Bronson's home. On frequent occasions over the years, she made 
derogatory remarks to Bronson personally, such as: "lay off my 
man, bitch," or "you've got my man!" After these vulgar comments, 
Jones would quickly hang up the telephone. (R. 74-77). 
On several occasions, Jones called Bronson and warned her not 
to get pregnant again. Jones told Bronson that she fully intended 
to get Bronson's husband and she did not want further 
complications. Those calls were usually made while Bronson and 
her husband were in bed. (R. 74-77). Jones explicitly 
broadcasted her intentions to destroy Bronson's marriage to many 
people. She admitted to those people that she repeatedly called 
Bronson's home to annoy her (R. 79-83), and hopefully break up the 
marriage. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment was entered on the basis that Bronson failed 
to show Jones actively pursued Bronson's husband. The motion to 
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amend to claim invasion of privacy was denied on the basis that it 
was predicated on the alienation of affections claim. 
Review of the governing law demonstrates that there was 
indeed alienation of affections, and that Jones acted 
intentionally and sufficiently to harm the marital relationship. 
The trial court ignored Bronson's sworn statements, and the 
statements of additional witnesses submitted in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment. 
To the extent that the facts underlying this issue were in 
dispute, the trial court should have resolved them in Ms. 
Bronson's favor in ruling on the summary judgment motion. 
Because the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment and remand this case for a trial. 
Likewise, in ruling to deny the motion to amend, the trial 
court ignored Bronson's affidavit and the affidavits of two 
witnesses, and erroneously found the amendment was predicated upon 
the alienation of affections claim. 
Because the trial court abused its discretion in denying the 
motion to amend, this court should reverse the trial court's order 
with specifications to allow the amendment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. ANY INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH THE MARRIAGE 
CAN SUPPORT A CLAIM OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS 
The trial court misread the law when it reasoned that summary 
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judgment was proper because Bronson fa i l ed t o show t h a t Jones 
pursued her husband a c t i v e l y . Judge Hanson wrote in h i s 
Memorandum Decision, 
[ A c c o r d i n g l y , t h e on ly e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e Cour t w i th 
r e s p e c t t o Mr. Bronson i s t h a t wi th t h e e x c e p t i o n of one 
t e l e p h o n e c a l l from t h e defendant t o Mr. Bronson i n 1998, 
t h e de fendan t has no t o t h e r w i s e c o n t a c t e d Mr. Bronson i n 
t h e l a s t four y e a r s . Fur thermore , whi le t h e r e i s ev idence 
t h a t t h e defendant has c o n t a c t e d p l a i n t i f f on a number of 
o c c a s i o n s , t h e n e c e s s a r y e l e m e n t of a l i e n a t i o n of 
a f f e c t i o n s i s t h a t t h e defendant a c t i v e l y pursue or e n t i c e 
t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s spouse . 1 
(R. 146). The t r i a l c o u r t ' s analysis i s wrong and not supported 
by any a u t h o r i t y . Alienat ion of affect ions does not occur only 
when the re i s a sexual r e l a t ionsh ip between a spouse and a t h i r d 
par ty or even in the "pursue or en t ice" scenario the t r i a l court 
devised. But i n t e r f e rence , whatever the type , with the mar i ta l 
r e l a t i o n i s the gravamen of the t o r t . The Utah Supreme Court has 
explained t h a t , 
The t o r t of a l i e n a t i o n of a f f e c t i o n s p r o t e c t s t h e mar r i age 
r e l a t i o n s h i p from a v a r i e t y of a s s a u l t s by t h i r d p e r s o n s , 
whether e x t r a m a r i t a l s exua l a f f a i r s a r e i nvo lved or n o t . 
Sexual misconduct i s only one means of d e s t r o y i n g spousa l 
a f f e c t i o n s . The g i s t of t h e t o r t i s t h e p r o t e c t i o n of t h e 
l o v e , s o c i e t y , companionship , and comfort t h a t form t h e 
f o u n d a t i o n of a m a r r i a g e and g i v e r i s e t o t h e un ique 
bond ing t h a t o c c u r s i n s u c c e s s f u l m a r r i a g e s . See W^  
*. The t r i a l court completely ignored the mater ia l importance of the sworn 
statements of P la in t i f f (R. 74-77) and two addi t ional witnesses (R. 78-83), 
and based i t s decision to grant summary judgment only on the r e s u l t of the 
deposition of P l a i n t i f f ' s husband, Mr. Lawrence Tracy Bronson. R. 41-51. The 
Court had denied the motion of Bronson's husband to supplement his deposit ion. 
(R. 144-148). 
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Keeton/ Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 124 at 
918 (5th ed.) Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982). 
Cf. Evans v. Oregon Short Line R.R. 37 Utah 431, 108 P. 638 
(1910) 
Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12-13 (Utah 1991)(Citations in 
original). 
To establish a case of alienation of affections, a Plaintiff 
has the burden of proving: 
1. The f a c t of a mar r i age , 
2 . The d e f e n d a n t ' s w i l l f u l and i n t e n t i o n a l a l i e n a t i o n of 
t h e w i f e ' s or husband 's a f f e c t i o n , and 
3 . A r e s u l t i n g l o s s of comfor t , s o c i e t y , and consor t ium 
of t h e wife or husband. 
See Wi l son v . O ld royd , 267 P .2d 759 ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 
In f a c t , only w i l l f u l and i n t e n t i o n a l ac t s t o a l i e n a t e a 
spouse of the a f f ec t i ons of another i s necessa ry . Acts of 
in te r fe rence with the mari ta l bonds do not have to be in the form 
of extra mari ta l a f f a i r s . 2 MacFarlane, 818 P.2d a t 13 (Utah 1991) 
c i t i n g t o O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986). In 
Schuckardt, the Idaho Supreme Court held t h i r d p a r t i e s , a church 
o rgan iza t ion and i t s members, l i a b l e for a l i e n a t i n g a w i f e ' s 
a f f ec t ions by using a combination of severe psychological and 
r e l i g i o u s pressures aimed a t the marr iage) . In our case , i t i s 
2
. Pursuant t o the Supreme Court 's analysis in Norton v. MacFarlane, 818 
P.2d 8, 12-13 (Utah 1991), for example, i f a jury determines t h a t Jones ' 
incessant telephone c a l l s to Bronson upset her husband and caused her a loss 
of love , comfort, soc ie ty and companionship, she can make a claim of 
a l iena t ion of affect ions . 
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obvious that the alleged conduct Bronson claims Jones perpetrated 
against her marriage constitutes conduct aimed expressly at the 
disrupting the bonding between her and her spouse. MacFarlane, 
818 P.2d at 13 (Utah 1991). 
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, note (g) states: "[i]n 
order for liability to arise for alienation of affections there 
must be an active and affirmative conduct." The facts show that 
Ms. Jones was unilaterally, actively, affirmatively and 
sufficiently campaigning to destroy Bronson's marriage or at least 
to harm it. Jones's adamant »»n«J stubborn contact with Bronson's 
family wrecked havoc in the marriage according to EL onsen's sworn 
statements. (R. 74-77). Ms. Jones's conduct has caused discord in 
the marriage, and Bronson's ultimate loss of love comfort, society 
and companionship. 
In the trial court, Ms. Jones did not contest the 
truthfulness of Bronson's affidavit or of the sworn statements of 
the other affiants. She merely relied on the deposition of 
Bronson's husband who only admitted to one personal contact with 
Jones in 1988, although later he tried to cure the defects in his 
deposition by supplementation.3 However, Bronson's detailed 
affidavit states: 
If Tammy Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having 
been sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in this matter. 
2. I am the wife of Lawrence Tracy Bronson. I have 
been married to Mr. Bronson since March 24, 1988. We have 
two children ages five and ten years old. 
3
 See note 1. 
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3. Shortly after our marriage, my husband had an 
affair with Ms. Lisa Ann Jones, the Defendant in this 
matter. The brief affair produced a child. 
4. However, after discovering that Ms. Jones was 
pregnant, my husband stopped seeing Ms. Jones, except for 
matters involving the child the affair produced. 
5. In the past the child has been at my home for 
visitations and was treated well. To try to have little, 
if anything, to do with Ms. Jones, child support is paid 
through the Office of Recovery Services, and for a period 
of time, we discontinued my husband's visitation rights. 
6. The fact that my husband and Ms. Jones had a 
child notwithstanding, Ms. Jones has been conducting a 
relentless campaign to get my husband to leave me and 
establish a relationship with her other than merely being a 
father to Ms. Jones's son. 
7. To achieve this, Ms. Jones has been repeatedly 
calling my home telephone number at any hour of the day and 
night for years up to the date she was served with process 
in this case. She always requested to speak to my husband 
if he was at home. The conversations she initiated had 
nothing to do with her son. She has continually been 
asking my husband to leave me and to start or restart a 
sexual relationship. My husband and I have asked Ms. Jones 
repeatedly to stop calling the marital home. But, to no 
avail. 
8. Besides the constant calling of my telephone 
number, Ms. Jones would continuously drive by house, making 
sure she is seen by my family. She did so for years up to 
date she was served with process in this case. This 
behavior and the calling of my telephone number have only 
increased many times over the months prior to my filing 
suit in this matter. 
9. Often Ms. Jones called my home from her job and 
if I answered, she would just stay on the telephone, 
breathing hard and making weird noises. Other times, she 
would quickly tell me to "lay off my man, bitch," or " 
you've got my man!" and hanged up the telephone. 
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10. On several occasions, Ms. Jones called me and 
warned me not to get pregnant again because she fully 
intended to get my husband and she did not want further 
complications. Those calls would usually be received while 
my husband and I would be in bed. 
11. Ms. Jones has told many people of her obsession 
with my husband and that she wanted me out of the picture. 
12. Ms. Jones's relentless pursuing of my husband has 
caused my husband to withdraw from me as a husband and 
lover. As a result of the conduct of Ms. Jones, my husband 
is often depressed and angry, mostly after encounters with 
Ms. Jones, either telephonically or via her following him 
in the streets or at other venues. 
13. My husband's withdrawal from me and his 
depression due to Ms. Jones's conduct have caused me to be 
deprived of his affection, to suffer loss of consortium and 
to suffer emotionally. 
14. My husband and I have tried everything we could 
to have Ms. Jones stop interfering with our marriage. We 
have not been successful. 
(R. 74-77)(Affidavit of Tammy Bronson) Addendum I. 
Additionally, Bronson submitted two witnesses' sworn 
statements in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The 
affidavit of Tina Bronson states: 
I, Tina Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I personally know Ms. Tammy Bronson, the Plaintiff in 
this matter. She is my sister-in-law. 
2. I personally know Ms. Lisa Jones, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. I met her in or around September 
1998. 
3. I was the baby-sitter for Ms. Jones's children from 
approximately December 1998 until about February 1999. 
4. I have had several conversations with Ms. Jones in 
which she revealed to me that she would habitually drive by 
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the Plaintiff's home. She said she did most of the driving 
there in January and February 1999. She said that 
sometimes she would drive there in the company of her 
mother. 
5. Ms. Jones also revealed to me that has repeatedly 
called the Plaintiff's telephone number, but would not say 
anything if the Plaintiff answered the telephones. She 
said she just held the telephone and listened to the 
Plaintiff saying hello, hello. 
. 82-83)(Affidavit of Tina Bronson) Addendum II. 
And the affidavit of Amy Bronson states: 
I, Amie Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I personally know Ms. Tammy Bronson, the Plaintiff in 
this matter. She is my sister-in-law. 
2. I personally know Ms. Lisa Jones, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. I met her in or around September 
1998. 
3. Ms. Jones told me that many times she would drive by 
the Plaintiff's home to check around. 
4. She told me on numerous times that she is much 
prettier than Plaintiff and that she could not understand 
how Plaintiff's husband could stay married to Plaintiff 
whom she thinks is utterly unattractive. 
5. Ms. Jones does not make it a secret that she loves and 
lusts for Plaintiff's husband, and that she would not stop 
at anything to break up the marriage and install herself in 
Plaintiff's place with Plaintiff's husband. 
. 82-83)(Affidavit of Tina Bronson) Addendum III. 
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In fact, Bronsonfs affidavit and the affidavits of Tina and 
Amy Bronson remain unopposed and are material facts that should 
have defeated the motion for summary judgment. 
It is worth inferring here that the trial court, in finding 
that "there is evidence that the defendant has contacted plaintiff 
on a number of occasions. (R. 146)(added emphasis), made a 
credibility assessment as to Bronson's allegations and her sworn 
statements, and also of the testimony of her support! rig affiants , 
only to weigh and dismiss their credibility against the deposition 
of Bronson's husband, Butf it is never proper for judges to make 
credibility determination at the summary judgment stage. This is 
traditionally the province of the trier of facts. "[Credibility 
determinations, the weigh!rig of evidence, and the drawing of 
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not the 
judge.... The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and 
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn i.n his favor." 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). 
The trial judge should have reasoned that the deposition 
testimony disputed the affidavits and created a factual and 
material dispute which, at the summary judgment level, should have 
been resolved in favor of Bronson. Instead, the trial court 
overlooked the cardinal rules governing the adjudication of 
summary judgment motions — that summary judgment is to be granted 
only when there are no material factual disputes, and that all 
facts and inferences are to be drawn in favor of the party 
opposing summary judgment — Ms. Bronson in this case. See e.g. 
Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982)(in summary 
12 
judgmentf all facts and inferences are to be drawn in favor of 
party opposing summary judgment). 
At a minimum, the trial court erred in resolving facts in 
favor of Jones and in granting summary judgment where the material 
facts underlying the claim of alienation of affections were in 
dispute. See Bowen, supra. 
This Court should therefore reverse the portion of Judge 
Hanson's ruling granting summary judgment on the basis that 
Bronson failed to show that Jones actively pursued or enticed her 
husband. 
II. 
THE FACTS INDEPENDENTLY SUPPORT 
A CLAIM OF INVASION OF PRIVACY 
As noted above, i n t h e Memorandum Decis ion g r a n t i n g summary 
judgment and deny ing B r o n s o n ' s motion t o amend, Judge Hanson 
s t a t e d , 
"The Court d e n i e s t h e proposed amendment t o add t h e c l a i m 
of i nvas ion of p r ivacy under t h e ' i n t r u s i o n upon s e c l u s i o n ' 
b ranch• The Court de t e rmines t h a t t h i s proposed c l a i m i s 
p r e d i c a t e d on t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s a l i e n a t i o n of a f f e c t i o n s 
c l a i m , which t h e Cour t d i s m i s s e s i n t h i s Memorandum 
D e c i s i o n . " 
(R. 147)(Addendum I V ) . 
In denying the Motion to Amend, the Court ignored the 
supporting affidavit of Bronson which states in relevant part: 
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I, Tammy Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having 
been sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
. . . . 
7. To achieve this, Ms. Jones has been repeatedly 
calling my home telephone number at any hour of the day and 
night for years up to date she was served with process in 
this case. She always requested speak to my husband if he 
was at home. The conversations she initiated had nothing 
to do with her son. She has continually been asking my 
husband to leave me and to start or restart a sexual 
relationship. My husband and I have asked Ms. Jones 
repeatedly to stop calling the marital home. But, to no 
avail. 
Besides the constant calling of my telephone 
number, Ms. Jones would continuously drive by house, making 
sure she is seen by my family. She did so for years up to 
date she was served with process in this case. This 
behavior and the calling of my telephone number have only 
increased many times over the months prior to my filing 
suit in this matter. 
9. Often Ms. Jones called my home from her job and 
if I answered, she would just stay on the telephone, 
breathing hard and making weird noises. Other times, she 
would quickly tell me to "lay off my man, bitch," or " 
you've got my man!" and hanged up the telephone. 
10. On several occasions, Ms. Jones called me and 
warned me not to get pregnant again because she fully 
intended to get my husband and she did not want further 
complications. Those calls would usually be received while 
my husband and I would be in bed. 
11. Ms. Jones has told many people of her obsession 
with my husband and that she wanted me out of the picture. 
... 
(R. 74-77)(Affidavit of Tammy Bronson) Addendum I. 
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The trial court also ignored the affidavit of Tina Bronson 
which states: 
I, Tina Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I personally know Ms. Tammy Bronson, the Plaintiff in 
this matter. She is my sister-in-law. 
2. I personally know Ms. Lisa Jones, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. I met her in or around September 
1998. 
3. I was the baby-sitter for Ms. Jones's children from 
approximately December 1998 until about February 1999. 
4. I have had several conversations with Ms. Jones in 
which she revealed to me that she would habitually drive by 
the Plaintiff's home. She said she did most of the driving 
there in January and February 1999. She said that 
sometimes she would drive there in the company of her 
mother. 
5. Ms. Jones also revealed to me that has repeatedly 
called the Plaintiff's telephone number, but would not say 
anything if the Plaintiff answered the telephones. She 
said she just held the telephone and listened to the 
Plaintiff saying hello, hello. 
(R. 82-83)(Affidavit of Tina Bronson) Addendum II. 
And the affidavit of Amy Bronson which states in relevant 
part: 
I, Amie (sic) Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having 
been sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
. . . . 
3. Ms. Jones told me that many times she would drive by 
the Plaintiff's home to check around. 
4. She told me on numerous times that she is much 
prettier than Plaintiff and that she could not understand 
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how P l a i n t i f f ' s husband could stay married to Pla in t i f f 
whom she thinks is ut terly unattractive. 
5. Ms. Jones does not make i t a secret that she loves and 
lusts for P la in t i f f ' s husband, and that she would not stop 
at anything to break up the marriage and ins t a l l herself in 
P la in t i f f ' s place with Pla in t i f f ' s husband. 
(R. 82-83) (Affidavit of Tina Bronson) Addenrliitii 111. 
To show a prima fac ie case for invas ion of pr ivacy or 
in t rus ion upon seclusion, a p l a i n t i f f has the burden l J show tha t 
her so l i t ude <u seclusion has been i n t e n t i o n a l l y invaded by the 
Defendant. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS, § 652B comment a (1977). 
Harass ing another with c o n t i n u a l t e lephone c a l l s has been 
recognized as suf f ic ien t to support a claim for i n t ru s ion . Harms 
v. Miami Daily News, 127 So. 2d 715 (Fla. App 1961). 
Bronson's a f f i d a v i t and the a f f i d a v i t s of Amy and Tina 
Bronson a l l e g e t h a t Jones made i n t r u s i v e te lephone c a l l s t o 
Bronson. Jones has never contes ted the fac t t h a t she made 
r e p e a t e d obscene t e l ephone c a l l s t o Bronson p e r s o n a l l y , 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the deposi t ion of Bronson's husband. Standing 
alone, the a l lega t ions of harassing telephone c a l l s are suf f ic ien t 
t o support a claim for invasion of pr ivacy, Thus, the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s finding t h a t the amendment was predicated upon the claim 
of a l i e n a t i o n of a f f ec t i ons i s l o g i c a l l y flawed and l e g a l l y 
unsound. 
Clear ly , the motion to amend to claim invasion of privacy was 
wel l - taken and the t r i a l court abused i t s d i s c r e t i on in denying 
the motion. 
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A. UNLESS THE DEFENDANT IS PREJUDICED, LEAVE FOR AMENDMENT 
SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 
complainant to amend a pleading once as a matter of right so long 
as no responsive pleading has been filed. Utah.R.Civ.Pro. 15(a). 
A pleader may also amend by obtaining leave of court. Id. 
Bronson was not seeking to amend to take an unfair advantage. 
Only if a defendant can demonstrate prejudice, or if the Court 
itself is prejudiced, is denial of a motion to amend appropriate. 
Under Utah law, a primary consideration that a trial judge must 
take into account in determining whether leave to amend should be 
granted [even during trial] is whether the opposing side would be 
put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for 
which she had no time to prepare. See Berkins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983); See also Startford v. Morgan, 689 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), overruled on other grounds, Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990); Erk v. Gleen, 116 F.2d 865 
(4th Cir. 1941)(leave to amend should be liberally granted where 
there is no prejudice). 
Conversely, it has been held that a trial court abused its 
discretion when it neither allowed the plaintiff to amend his 
complaint to conform to an issue raised for the first time at 
trial nor allow him to try the newly raised issue. Lloyd's 
Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktq., Ltd., 753 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. 
1988). 
Prime consideration in determining whether amendment to 
pleadings should be permitted is adequacy of opportunity for 
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opposing party to meet newly-raised matter. Lewis v. Moultree, 
627 P.2d 94 (Utah 1981). 
B. THE AMENDMENT SOUGHT WAS NOT INTENDED TO DEFEAT SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Although Jones had filed a motion for summary judgment, 
Bronson had already filed her opposition to the motion, making a 
good faith argument to defeat it. Anyway, the motion for summary 
judgment should not have precluded the Court's discretion in 
granting leave to amend. Utah law recognizes that although a 
motion for summary judgment may be pending, if an amendment seeks 
to effect substantial changes in the issues, it should be granted. 
Dupler v. Yates, 351 P.2d 624 (Utah 1960). Here, to conform to 
the evidence, Bronson sought to add two distinct allegations, 
invasion of privacy and the collateral infliction of emotional 
distress, that did not substantially affect the issues already 
argued in summary judgment. Actually, under the facts of this 
case alleging incessant telephone calls to Bronson's home, Bronson 
could have waited until trial to move to amend, but moved the 
court when she did to allow Jones greater opportunity to adjust 
her strategy. See Rinwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 
1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990)(in 
considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations are 
whether parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and 
whether any party receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage). 
The trial court erroneously found that the motion to amend 
was predicated upon the same claim of alienation of affections, 
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and at a minimum abused its discretion in denying the motion to 
amend in view of the evidence presented. 
This Court should therefore reverse the portion of Judge 
Hanson's Order denying the motion to amend. 
CONCLUSION 
There was enough evidence that should have been viewed in 
favor of Bronson to defeat the motion for summary judgment. There 
was absolutely sufficient evidence independently supporting the 
claim for intrusion of privacy. The trial court erred on both 
issues. This Court should reverse the order granting summary 
judgment, and the denial of the motion to amend, and remand this 
matter for trial. 
Dated this 30th day of May, 2000. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY BRONSON, S 
PLAINTIFF J 
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LISA ANN JONES, J 
DEFENDANT. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF TAMMY BRONSON 
: CIVIL NO. 990900347 
: JUDGE T. R. HANSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Tammy Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in this matter. 
2. I am the wife of Lawrence Tracy Bronson. I have been 
married to Mr. Bronson since March 24, 1988. We have two children 
ages five and ten years old. 
3. Shortly after our marriage, my husband had an affair 
with Ms. Lisa Ann Jones, the Defendant in this matter. The brief 
affair produced a child. 
4. However, after discovering that Ms. Jones was pregnant, 
my husband stopped seeing Ms. Jones, except for matters involving 
the child the affair produced. 
5. In the past the child has been at my home for 
visitations and was treated well. To try to have little, if 
anything, to do with Ms. Jones, child support is paid through the 
Office of Recovery Services, and for a period of time, we 
discontinued my husband's visitation rights. 
6. The fact that my husband and Ms. Jones had a child 
notwithstanding, Ms. Jones has been conducting a relentless 
campaign to get my husband to leave me and establish a 
relationship with her other than merely being a father to Ms. 
Jones's son. 
7. To achieve this, Ms. Jones has been repeatedly calling 
"ftiy home telephone number at any hour of the day and night for 
years up to date she was served with process in this case. She 
always requested speak to my husband if he was at home. The 
conversations she initiated had nothing to do with her son. She 
has continually been asking my husband to leave me and to start or 
restart a sexual relationship. My husband and I have asked Ms. 
Jones repeatedly to stop calling the marital home. But, to no 
avail. 
\ 8. Besides the constant calling of my telephone number, Ms. 
Jones would continuously drive by house, making sure she is seen 
by my family. She did so for years up to date she was served with 
process in this case. This behavior and the calling of my 
telephone number have only increased many times over the months 
prior to my filing suit in this matter. 
VA 9. Often Ms. Jones called my home from her job and if I 
answered, she would just stay on the telephone, breathing hard and 
making weird noises. Other times, she would quickly tell me to 
"lay off my maja^  bitch," or " you've, got my man I" and hanged up 
the telephone. 
I(10A On several occasions, Ms. Jones called me and warned me 
not to get pregnant again because she fully intended to get my 
husband and she did not want further complications. Those calls 
would ussually be received while my husband and I would be in bed. 
11. Ms. Jones has told many people of her obsession with my 
husband and that she wanted me out of the picture. 
12. Ms. Jones's relentless pursuing of my husband has caused 
my husband to withdraw from me as a husband and lover. As a 
result of the conduct of Ms. Jones, my husband is often depressed 
and angry, mostly after encounters with Ms. Jones, either 
telephonically or via her following him in the streets or at other 
venues. 
13. My husband's withdrawal from me and his depression due 
to Ms. Jones' s conduct have caused me to be deprived of his 
affection, to suffer loss of consortium and to suffer emotionally. 
14. My husband and I have tried everything we could to have 
Ms. Jones stop interfering with our marriage. We have not been 
successful. 
DATED this 13 Hfc day of May, 1999, 
Tammy Btonson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12 day of May, 
1999. 
h«s •"-"a 4*ij i~h» mmm wx. 
Notary Public 
ORSON B. WEST. JR. 
1G0 South 300 West, Suite 215 
Salt lake City, Utah 64101 
My Commissi DO Expires 
March 19 2000 
State ot Utah 
0 6 1 l 
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ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW O F F I C E S 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, S U I T E 208 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 8 4 1 0 1 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 5 9 - 6 8 4 4 
ATTORNEY FOR P L A I N T I F F 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY BRONSON, ; 
PLAINTIFF J 
V S . J 
LISA ANN JONES, : 
DEFENDANT. : 
: AFFIDAVIT OF AMIE BRONSON 
\ CIVIL NO. 990900347 
: JUDGE T. R. HANSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Amie Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I personally know Ms. Tammy Bronson, the Plaintiff in 
this matter. She is my sister-in-law. 
2. I personally know Ms. Lisa Jones, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. I met her in or around September 1998. 
3. Ms. Jones told me that many times she would drive by the 
Plaintiff's home to check around. 
4. She told me on numerous times that she is much prettier 
than Plaintiff and that she could not understand how Plaintiff's 
husband could stay married to Plaintiff whom she thinks is utterly 
unattractive. 
5. Ms. Jones does not make it a secret that she loves and 
lusts for Plaintiff's husband, and that she would not stop at 
anything to break up the marriage and install herself in 
Plaintiff's place with Plaintiff's husband. 
DATED this /& day of April, 1999. 
f 4i ArnieBronson 








 s « J c u» »TU *-:=: 
Kuiarv PuLi c 
ORSON B, WEST, JR. 
1 JO South 3 0 J .t, t Sw e215 
Se't take City UL.no4i0l 
My Con TUC<. on Expires 
March 19 2GuO 
State o» Liaii KEiS 
Addendum III 
BEL-AMI DE MONTREUX, #6207 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
MONTREUX LAW OFFICES 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, SUITE 208 
SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 84101 
TELEPHONE (801) 359-6844 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY BRONSON, J 
PLAINTIFF J 
VS. ! 
LISA ANN JONES, J 
DEFENDANT. ; 
\ AFFIDAVIT OF TINA BRONSON 
: CIVIL NO. 990900347 
: JUDGE T. R. HANSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Tina Bronson, a person over the age of 18, having been 
sworn upon my oath, depose and state the following: 
1. I personally know Ms. Tammy Bronson, the Plaintiff in 
this matter. She is my sister-in-law. 
2. I personally know Ms. Lisa Jones, the Defendant in the 
above-captioned matter. I met her in or around September 1998. 
3. I was the baby-sitter for Ms. Jones's children from 
approximately December 1998 until about February 1999. 
4. I have had several conversations with Ms. Jones in which 
she revealed to me that she would habitually drive by the 
Plaintiff's home. She said she did most of the driving there in 
January and February 1999. She said that sometimes she would 
drive there in the company of her mother. 
5. Ms. Jones also revealed to me that has repeatedly called 
the Plaintiff's telephone number, but would not say anything if 
the Plaintiff answered the telephones. She said she just held the 
telephone and listened to the Plaintiff saying hello, hello. 
DATED this 1 \£> day of April, 1999. 
Tina Br 
l/yi^J^ArtjJfrJy 
/& y ^ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o before me t h i s ' ° day of 
A p r i l , 1999. 
PfiSONb 
100 South 30. . > i.v 
Salt Lake Ci'., L, < , "0 : 6L 
My coinvss on Exp.^  , P u b l i c No ta ry 
March 19 20oQ \ J 
Stated Utah i 
Addendum IV 
•T*C ?U f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TAMMY BRONSON, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
P l a i n t i f f
'
 ! CASEN0
- IftWfiSftiST COURT 
_yo . Third Judicial District 
LISA ANN JONES, S AUG 3 1 1999 
Defendant . : ^ ^ T LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint, The 
parties appeared through counsel on August 2, 1999, and argued 
their respective positions. Following oral argument, the Court 
took the matter under advisement to further consider the written 
submissions of the parties. Since having taken the Motions under 
advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to consider the law, 
all relevant pleadings and facts and oral argument in this case. 
Being otherwise fully advised, the Court enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The plaintiff and Tracy Bronson were married on March 24, 
1988. On September 18, 1989, Mr. Bronson, who was previously 
acquainted with the defendant, had a brief affair with her. Also 
in 1989, the plaintiff and Mr. Bronson separated due to marital 
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problems unrelated to the affair. During the separation, the 
defendant and Mr. Bronson resumed their affair. As a result of the 
affair, the defendant became pregnant and gave birth to a son. In 
May 1990, Mr. Bronson moved back in with the plaintiff and refused 
to see the defendant again. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In order for the plaintiff to bring a successful action for 
alienation of affections, she has to establish that the defendant 
purposely attempted to alienate Mr. Bronson1s affections from her. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §683 (1977) . The Court interprets 
§683 and the Utah case law discussing the tort of alienation of 
affections as requiring the plaintiff to identify the existence of 
efforts to alienate on the part of the defendant aimed directly at 
the spouse which are the controlling cause of the marital discord. 
See Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8 (Utah 1991). The Court 
therefore considers whether the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant has made such efforts. 
The defendant took Mr. Bronson1s deposition on March 16, 1999. 
In that deposition, Mr. Bronson testified that he and the defendant 
had not been in contact for over four years. After the deposition 
was taken, Mr. Bronson prepared a number of amendments to the 
transcript which directly contradicted his deposition testimony. 
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For instance, one of Mr. Bronson's "amendments" states that the 
defendant has virtually been in constant contact with him since 
1998, making telephone calls to his home and following him on the 
street. During oral argument, the defendant's counsel asked the 
Court not to consider Mr. Bronsonfs "amendments" because they 
exceeded the scope of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e), which 
permits deponents to make limited corrections to deposition 
testimony. The Court agreed with the defendant and ruled that 
because Mr. Bronson's additional testimony was contrary to his 
original testimony it would not be considered by the Court. 
Accordingly, the only evidence before the Court with respect 
to Mr. Bronson is that with the exception of one telephone call 
from the defendant to Mr. Bronson in 1998, the defendant has not 
otherwise contacted Mr. Bronson in the last four years. 
Furthermore, while there is evidence that the defendant has 
contacted the plaintiff on a number of occasions, the necessary 
element of alienation of affections is that the defendant actively 
pursue or entice the plaintiff's spouse. In fact, the typical 
defense raised in an alienation of affections lawsuit is that the 
plaintiff's spouse is the one who pursued the defendant or that the 
plaintiff's spouse voluntarily gave his or her affections to the 
defendant. The focus, therefore, is on the contact between the 
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defendant and the plaintiff's spouse, not on the plaintiff. 
Inasmuch as the evidence fails to prove that Mr. Bronson was 
pursued by the defendant in an effort to deprive the plaintiff of 
the enjoyment of the marital relationship, the Court determines 
that the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted. 
The Court next considers the plaintiff's Motion to Amend. 
The Court denies the plaintiff's proposed amendment to add the 
claim of "emotional distress" because this claim is essentially the 
same as the "emotional distress" claim previously dismissed by the 
Court. The Court also denies the proposed amendment to add the 
claim of invasion of privacy under the "intrusion upon seclusion" 
branch. The Court determines that this proposed claim is 
predicated on the plaintiff's alienation of affections claim, which 
the Court dismisses in this Memorandum Decision. Accordingly, the 
plaintiff's Motion to Amend is denied in the entirety. 
Counsel for the defendant is to prepare an Order consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision and submit the same to the Court for 
review and signature. 
Dated this '\ I day of August, 1999. 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this day of 
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